Population Growth and Decline in City Neighborhoods by G. Thomas Kingsley & Kathryn L. S. Pettit
It is now well known that populations in
America’s cities generally grew faster over
the past decade than they did in the 1980s.
But how was this growth distributed across
neighborhoods in these cities? It matters
considerably whether the poor inner-city
communities that lost population so dra-
matically in the 1980s shared in the overall
improvement or whether the higher growth
rates were found only in areas that were bet-
ter off to begin with. And what impact did
racial composition have on neighborhood
population change? This paper reviews the
evidence from the U.S. Census for the cen-
tral cities of the nation’s 100 largest metro-
politan areas (listed in appendix table A1).1
Major findings are as follows:
 Almost all types of neighborhoods (cen-
sus tracts) in these cities did better in the
1990s (median population growth of 
2.7 percent) than the 1980s (median loss
of 0.5 percent). Comparing the two
decades, the share of all tracts that grew
significantly (by 5 percent or more)
increased from 36 percent to 44 percent,
while the share with significant losses
dropped from 34 percent to 27 percent.
 Improvement was not the same for all
types of neighborhoods, nor was it
enough to overturn past differences. For
example, neighborhoods that had been
predominantly (more than 60 percent)
black in 1990 fared worst in the 1990s
(median population decline of 7 percent),
although this was a marked improvement
over their 1980s median loss of 11 percent,
whereas neighborhoods with no predom-
inant race grew fastest (8 percent gain).
 Within all types of neighborhoods in both
decades, higher poverty rates were
closely associated with population loss.
In the 1990s, high-poverty tracts (poverty
rates of 30 percent or more in 1990) suf-
fered a median loss of 5 percent, com-
pared with a gain of 5 percent for tracts
with poverty rates of less than 10 percent.
 Neighborhoods in sunbelt cities gener-
ally grew faster in the 1990s than those
in rustbelt cities, but there were major
differences within regions. In all regions,
neighborhoods of all types in “Melting
Pot” cities (in metropolitan areas with
the largest minority populations, partic-
ularly nonblack minorities) typically did
much better (median +7 percent) than
those in “Largely White-Black” cities
(–3 percent), and “Largely White” cities
(–2 percent).2
 Despite the general trend, there was a
non-trivial number of high poverty
neighborhoods whose populations grew
significantly (by 5 percent or more) in the
1990s. They are important because they
demonstrate that it is possible to attract
growth to some high-poverty environ-
ments. These neighborhoods made up 
29 percent of all high-poverty tracts in
the 100 cities overall, but even higher
shares in the West and the Melting Pot
cities of the other three regions.
 Racial change played a role, but it was
not dominant. Hispanics increased 
their share of tract population signifi-
cantly (by 20 percentage points or more)
in only 5 percent of all tracts in the 
100 cities but in 9 percent of the growing
high-poverty tracts. Blacks experienced
significant share increases in a smaller 
4 percent of all tracts and in only 2 per-
cent of the growing high-poverty tracts.
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Purpose and Approach
The 100 largest metropolitan areas in
the United States accounted for 
60 percent of the country’s population
in 2000 but for much higher shares of
its wealth and the sectors that will
drive its economic future. One-third
of the population in these areas (54
million out of 169 million) lived in
their central cities—places that, few
would deny, are still critically impor-
tant to the nation’s well-being.
In the early 1990s, the prospects
for cities, particularly in the rustbelt
states, seemed at a low point. Even
after evidence of resurgence in some
urban neighborhoods later in the
decade, careful analysis of available
data did not provide a basis for much
optimism (Kasarda et al. 1997).
However, results from the 2000 cen-
sus have been analyzed (Glaeser and
Shapiro 2001, Katz and Berube 2002,
Simmons and Lang 2001), and while
they do not indicate a dramatic turn-
around, they reflect considerable
improvement over those of the pre-
ceding decade.
Among the central cities of the
100 largest metropolitan areas, only
36 grew by 5 percent or more in the
1980s; in the 1990s, 49 did so. The
number that suffered any decline
shrank from 44 to 36. Altogether, the
growth rate for these cities increased
from 4.5 percent in the 1980s to 
7.2 percent in the 1990s.
The implications of these results,
of course, depend on how they vary
by region and type of city (more will
be said about that later), but the pat-
terns of growth and decline within
cities are also highly significant. A
city’s average growth rate could
mask a serious deepening of dispari-
ties between neighborhoods or an
alleviation of them. The most impor-
tant measures of disparities rely on
economic variables (including pov-
erty) in the census long-form data
files, which (as of this writing) have
not been released for 2000. In the
meantime, data on population change
alone can provide useful insights.
This paper reviews data from the
2000 census short-form files for these
100 cities to determine what kinds of
neighborhoods grew and declined in
the 1990s and how those results com-
pared with patterns of change in the
1980s.3 The analysis uses census tracts
as its units of reference (we use the
terms “tracts” and “neighborhoods”
interchangeably throughout).
We start by looking at changes for
all 14,041 tracts in these cities, charac-
terizing them by their 1990 racial
composition and poverty levels.4 We
then review how population changes
in the 100 cities themselves varied by
region and type of city. This review
provides a basis for understanding
the next topic: regional and type vari-
ations in patterns of neighborhood
growth and decline within the cities.
We close by answering two questions
of special interest. First, what share of
all neighborhoods experienced signif-
icant racial change, and where were
they located? Second, did any tracts
with high poverty rates grow signifi-
cantly? If so, how many and where
were they located?
Data for this analysis came from
the Neighborhood Change Database
(NCDB), the only source of tract-level
census data in which tract boundaries
are defined consistently over time. We
also hold metropolitan area and city
boundaries constant; data for all geo-
graphic units and years are presented
for boundaries as defined in 2000.5
For simplicity, we consistently
divide the population for all years
into four groups by ethnicity and race:
“Hispanic” and three racial groups
(white, black, and other), always
defined to exclude Hispanics of those
races.6 To understand the discussion
of neighborhood change that follows,
it is helpful to know in advance that
these groups made very different con-
tributions to city growth in the 1990s
(figure 1; see also Berube 2001). In the
100 cities, whites remain the largest
group, but their number declined by
10 percent (from 26.1 million to 23.5
million). The numbers of blacks
increased, but only by a modest 8 per-
cent (from 12.9 million to 14.0 mil-
lion). The Hispanic and “other”
groups made the largest contribution,
together increasing by 43 percent
(from 11.7 million to 16.7 million), in
the process surpassing the black total.
Neighborhood Population
Change—National Overview
Research on urban spatial patterns
over the past decade has stressed the
influence of both poverty levels and
race on variations in neighborhood
conditions (e.g., Jargowsky 1997). We
find that both were also critically
important to neighborhood popula-
tion change in the 1980s and 1990s.
In the 1980s, there was a consis-
tent relationship between poverty
and population change: The higher
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FIGURE 1.  Total Population, Central Cities of 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 1990–2000
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the poverty rate, the higher the prob-
ability of population loss (figure 2).
The 1990s exhibited the same pattern,
but with modest improvement in
every category (larger gains, smaller
losses). The median decennial popu-
lation change rate for all tracts in the
100 cities went from a small loss 
(–0.5 percent) in the 1980s to a modest
gain (+2.7 percent) in the 1990s. The
tracts with the lowest poverty rates as
of 1990 (under 10 percent) had a
much better record, with a median
gain of +2 percent in the 1980s, rising
substantially to +5 percent in the
1990s. At the other extreme, tracts
with the highest poverty rates 
(30 percent or more) experienced seri-
ous losses in the 1990s (median of 
–5 percent), although less serious
than in the 1980s (–8 percent).
There were also substantial dif-
ferences by race/ethnicity. We look at
the results for tracts in four cate-
gories: where the predominant race
(more than 60 percent of the popula-
tion in 1990) was white, black, or
Hispanic, and where there was no
predominant race. (Since there were
only 109 tracts where the predomi-
nant race was “other” in 1990, we left
them out of this analysis.)
Results were similar to those for
the poverty groups. Although each
category had a distinctly different
experience, measures for the 1990s
typically represented an improvement
over those in the 1980s. For tracts that
were predominantly white, for exam-
ple, the median population change
went from –0.5 percent to +3 percent.
This was a larger gain than the aver-
age for the 100 cities nationally, al-
though population gains in tracts that
were predominantly white in 1990 are
partially explained by in-migration of
Hispanics and people of other races.
Predominantly black tracts, like
high-poverty tracts, experienced seri-
ous losses in the 1990s (median of 
–7 percent); nonetheless, this was an
improvement over their median loss
of –11 percent in the 1980s. Tracts
with no predominant race experi-
enced above-average growth in 
both periods, with the median
increasing modestly from +7 percent
to +8 percent.
For tracts that were predomi-
nantly Hispanic in 1990, the pattern
was different. They had by far the
highest median growth rate in the
1980s (+10 percent), but their median
dropped to +4 percent in the 1990s.
The absolute number of Hispanics in
these tracts was quite small in 1980
and much larger in 1990, which makes
it not that surprising that the rate of
growth dropped, even though the
absolute growth continued to be high.
Clearly, an important share of the
impressive net increase in Hispanics in
cities during the 1990s took place in
tracts that were not predominantly
Hispanic at the start of that decade.
Generally, within each of these
racial/ethnic groups, population
growth was inversely correlated with
1990 poverty rates. More specifically:
 Predominant race = white (6,894
tracts). Consistent patterns in both
decades: The higher the poverty
rate, the weaker the growth, but
growth in every category was bet-
ter in the 1990s than in the 1980s.
In tracts with poverty rates below
10 percent, the median growth rose
from +0.9 percent to +5 percent. In
tracts with poverty rates above 
40 percent, the median rate of
decline dropped from –5 percent 
to –3 percent.
 Predominant race = black
(2,983 tracts). Similarly consistent
relationships but lower on the
chart: declines in all categories in
the 1980s, generally less severe in
the 1990s, and turning positive in
the lowest poverty category. The
median rates of decline in the
highest poverty category (above 
40 percent) are extreme: –18 per-
cent in the 1980s, dropping only to
–14 percent in the 1990s.
 Predominant race = Hispanic
(1,058 tracts). Substantial rates of
growth in all categories in both
decades, although, as with other
groups, growth diminishes as
poverty rates increase. There is an
important internal difference,
however. For tracts in the lowest
poverty category, the 1990s median
growth rate (+23 percent) was
much higher than that for the
1980s (+15 percent), but in all other
categories (those with higher
poverty rates), 1990s growth was
noticeably slower than 1980s
growth.
 No predominant race (2,957
tracts). Median growth rates
decline regularly as poverty goes
up, and there is not much differ-
ence between experiences in the
two decades.
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City-Level Population Change
by City Type and Region
Our next objective was to find out
whether and how these national find-
ings vary across the nation. Before we
looked into how neighborhoods
changed, however, we characterized
the variation in population growth
and decline among the 100 cities
themselves.
To be sure, a large part of the
story is regional. The sunbelt contin-
ued to outperform the rustbelt, but in
all regions populations of these cities
grew during the 1990s, and in all
regions but one they performed
better than they had in the preceding
decade (see table 1 and discussion in
Glaeser and Shapiro 2001). The low-
est 1990s decennial growth rate was
recorded by the cities in the Midwest:
only +0.1 percent, but still a marked
improvement over their –5 percent
during the 1980s. Rates for cities in
the Northeast picked up from 
+0.3 percent to +4 percent and, in the
South, from +5 percent to +9 percent.
The highest 1990s growth rate was
the +14 percent achieved in the West.
This rate is down from the extraordi-
nary +18 percent this region’s cities
recorded in the 1980s, but in these cir-
cumstances that sort of drop should
probably be seen more as a relief than
a problem, in policy terms.
Regions do not tell the whole
story, however. As suggested by 
table 1, forces other than sunshine 
are working to create major variations
within regions. An important part of
this variation is captured by the
framework developed by demogra-
pher William Frey (2001). He divides
metropolitan areas into three basic
categories: Melting Pot metros are
those in which whites account for no
more than 69 percent of the 2000 pop-
ulation and minorities other than
blacks account for more than 18 per-
cent. Largely White-Black metros are
metropolitan areas in which blacks
account for at least 16 percent of the
population. All other metropolitan
areas are classified as Largely White.7
Central cities in the Melting Pot
metros account for a very large share
of the growth in these 100 cities, with
a 1990s growth rate of +11 percent
nationally (compared with only 
+3 percent for those in Largely White
metros and a negligible +0.3 for those
in Largely White-Black metros).
In the Northeast, the Melting Pot
cities include New York City and
three cities in northern New Jersey.
Together they grew by +9 percent in
the 1990s (up from +3 percent in the
1980s), while cities in the other two
categories declined in both decades.
The 15 central cities in Largely White
metros make up the only group on
table 1 that actually did worse in the
TABLE 1.  Population Level and Change, 1980–2000 (Central Cities of 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas)
2000 population Population change Percent of total Population change
No. of (million) Central City (%) population 2000 (%) 1990–00 (%)
metro.
areas Metro. Central City 1980–90 1990–00 Black Hispanic & other Black Hispanic & other
Northeast
Melting Pot 4 13 9 3 9 27 39 10 33
Largely White 15 16 3 –2 –4 27 20 11 47
Largely White-Black 1 5 2 –6 –4 43 14 6 52
Total 20 34 13 0 4 29 32 9 36
Midwest
Melting Pot 2 11 4 –6 4 33 29 4 42
Largely White 13 13 4 0 2 27 8 15 87
Largely White-Black 5 11 2 –11 –7 61 9 3 55
Total 20 35 10 –5 0 37 15 7 52
South
Melting Pot 10 23 7 9 14 22 44 4 46
Largely White 8 8 2 0 7 21 12 17 70
Largely White-Black 19 23 7 3 5 46 7 12 117
Total 37 55 16 5 9 31 25 10 53
West
Melting Pot 18 37 13 21 14 9 51 5 39
Largely White 5 8 2 1 12 9 24 14 63
Total 23 45 15 18 14 9 47 6 40
Total U.S.
Melting Pot 34 84 32 9 11 19 44 6 39
Largely White 41 45 11 0 3 23 15 14 62
Largely White-Black 25 40 11 –2 0 49 8 9 81
Total 100 169 54 5 7 26 31 8 43
Source: Neighborhood Change Database, 1980, 1990, 2000.
Note: Excludes tracts with less than 200 population in both 1990 and 2000 and tracts with zero population in 1990.
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1990s (–4 percent) than it had in the
1980s (–2 percent), but this group is
mixed. Two of its cities (Boston, with
+3 percent growth in the 1990s, and
Providence, with +8 percent) were
close to meeting the criteria for the
Melting Pot category and behaved as
if they had. Almost all the rest in the
Largely White group lost population
in the 1990s, three at a rate of more
than –10 percent (Syracuse, Buffalo,
and Hartford). Philadelphia is the
only Largely White-Black metro in
the Northeast. Its population
dropped by –4 percent in the 1990s;
nonetheless, a better performance
than its –6 percent in the preceding
decade.
There were only two Melting Pot
metros in the Midwest (Chicago and
Minneapolis), but their central cities
also dominated city growth in their
region(+4 percent in the 1990s, an
impressive turnaround from their –6
percent in the 1980s). Cities in the 13
Largely White metros in this region
had varied growth rates, but their
populations together grew by only +2
percent in the 1990s. Again, it was the
cities in the Largely White-Black met-
ros that suffered most (decline of –7
percent, although that marked a clear
improvement over their average loss
of –11 percent in the 1980s). Two cities
in this category (Gary and St. Louis)
lost more than 10 percent of their
populations in the 1990s.
In the South, the 10 Melting Pot
metros are Washington, D.C., plus 3
in Florida and 6 in Texas. Together,
their central cities grew by +9 percent
in the 1980s, increasing to +14 percent
in the 1990s. There are eight Largely
White metros in the South, with cen-
tral city growth of +0.3 percent in the
1980s, moving up to +7 percent in the
1990s. Unlike the experience in the
northern regions, the cities in the
Largely White-Black metros in the
South have grown substantially since
1980 (+3 percent in the 1980s, +5 per-
cent in the 1990s), if less rapidly than
the other categories in this region.
Melting Pot metros make up a
larger share of all metropolitan areas
from the top 100 in the West than any
other region (18 of 23). They include
all of those in California, Nevada,
Arizona, and New Mexico. The
growth rate of their central cities in
the 1990s was the highest across all
categories in table 1 (+14 percent),
although it represented a drop from
an even higher +21 percent in the
preceding decade. The five Largely
White metros in this region include
those in the Pacific Northwest plus
Denver and Salt Lake City. Growth in
their central cities, in contrast, accel-
erated over these two decades, mov-
ing up from +1 percent to +12 percent
(major growth increases in Denver,
Salt Lake City, Seattle, and Portland).
There are no Largely White-Black
metros in the top 100 in the West.
The last four columns of table 1
deal with racial/ethnic composition
and change in these categories. The
contrasts with respect to composition
are sharp, as would be expected
because of the way these categories
are defined.
Rates of change in the 1990s also
exhibit dramatic differences. Blacks
increased in every category (average
+8 percent), but in all regions they
made more headway in the Largely
White metros (+14 percent on aver-
age) than the other categories. The
increases were notably higher in the
Northeast and South regions (+9 and
+10 percent) than in the West and
Midwest (+6 and +7 percent).
The “Hispanic and other” cate-
gory experienced the most pro-
nounced change, increasing by 
43 percent on average (more than 
five times the average growth rate for
blacks). Their growth rates were
highest by far in every region and
category; substantially higher in the
Largely White and Largely White-
Black categories than in the Melting
Pot group. The Melting Pot cities,
however, had much larger Hispanic
and Other populations to begin with
and thus accounted for by far the
largest absolute change: an increase
of 4.0 million, compared with only
643,000 for the Largely White cities
and 396,000 for the Largely White-
Black cities.
The residual group (not shown
on the table) is the white population.
It declined in every category but
one—the Largely White metros of the
West, where it increased modestly. In
every region, loss rates for whites
were highest in the Largely White-
Black metros, particularly in the
Midwest (–30 percent). However,
these averages mask the fact that
their numbers did increase in 
17 cities: 9 in the South (including
Atlanta, Austin, Charlotte, and
Jacksonville) and 8 in the West
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(including Denver, Phoenix, San
Francisco, and Seattle).
Neighborhood Change 
in Different Regions 
and Types of Cities
How did our overall story about
neighborhood growth and decline
hold up in different regions and types
of cities? Fairly well in general, but
there were some exceptions to each of
those findings (table 2).
 Neighborhoods that were predom-
inantly black in 1990 fared worse
than others virtually everywhere
in the 1990s. This meant major
losses for these tracts in all city
types in the Midwest (median of
–11 percent), South (–8 percent),
and Largely White and Largely
White-Black cities of the Northeast
(–12 and –10 percent, respectively).
However, blacks did register gains
in the Melting Pot cities of the
Northeast and in the West as a
whole (although it is important to
point out that there were very few
predominantly black tracts in the
West).
Given the comparative overall
growth experiences, it is not sur-
prising that other types of neigh-
borhoods generally grew fastest in
Melting Pot cities. For neighbor-
hoods that were predominantly
white and those with no predomi-
nant race, patterns were similar.
Their highest growth rates by far
were in Melting Pot cities of the
Northeast and South, with some-
what lower growth in Melting Pot
cities of the other two regions and
the Largely White cities in the
West. The contrasts were some-
times striking within regions. The
median growth rates for predomi-
nantly white tracts in the
Northeast Melting Pot cities, for
example, was +11 percent, com-
pared with a median loss of –3 per-
cent for those in the Largely White
cities of that region. The pattern
for predominantly Hispanic tracts
was not that different, but the
number of such tracts in the non-
Melting Pot cities of most regions
was too small to convey meaning-
ful differences.
 Neighborhoods with high poverty
rates in 1990 did worse than aver-
age in almost all racial categories
and locations. The only notable
exception that involved a sizeable
number of tracts was predomi-
TABLE 2.  Change in Tract Population by Predominant Race and Poverty Level (Central Cities of 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas)
Source: Neighborhood Change Database, 1980, 1990, 2000.
Note: Excludes tracts with less than 200 population in both 1990 and 2000 and tracts with zero population in 1990; sn = small number of tracts (10 or fewer); predominant 
race = race or ethnic group accounting for 60 percent or more of tract population; predominant race and poverty rates as of 1990.
Median population change of tracts, 1990–2000, by predominant race and poverty rate
Total White Black Hispanic No predominant race
No. of
Tracts Total Poverty > 30% Total Poverty > 30% Total Poverty > 30% Total Poverty > 30%
Northeast
Melting Pot 2,337 11 6 5 1 10 7 13 6
Largely White 839 –3 –6 –12 –16 –16 –16 –4 –9
Largely White-Black 361 0 sn –10 –13 sn sn –2 –6
Total 3,537 5 –3 –2 –7 7 4 8 1
Midwest
Melting Pot 1,039 6 9 –7 –11 4 2 8 7
Largely White 1,264 –2 –9 –14 –16 sn sn –6 –8
Largely White-Black 889 –1 –2 –12 –17 sn sn –3 –12
Total 3,192 –1 –6 –11 –16 2 0 1 –4
South
Melting Pot 1,629 11 5 –8 –8 2 –1 15 14
Largely White 664 4 –1 –8 –10 sn sn 2 3
Largely White-Black 1,730 4 –2 –8 –11 sn sn 0 –3
Total 4,023 5 –1 –8 –10 2 –1 8 6
West
Melting Pot 2,792 7 12 6 7 4 1 9 7
Largely White 497 6 20 16 sn 20 sn 15 11
Total 3,289 6 17 6 9 5 2 10 8
Total U.S.
Melting Pot 7,797 8 9 –2 –6 4 2 11 8
Largely White 3,264 0 –5 –13 –14 –3 –10 –1 –5
Largely White-Black 2,980 2 –2 –10 –14 –15 –15 –1 –6
Total 14,041 4 –2 –7 –12 4 2 8 3
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nantly white tracts in the West. In
the West as a whole, the median
growth rate for white high-poverty
tracts (those with poverty rates of
30 percent or more) was +17 per-
cent, compared with +6 percent for
all white tracts. Large cities in the
West typically have more undevel-
oped land in their boundaries than
cities in other regions, and high-
poverty white tracts are more
likely to be found in the fringe por-
tions of those cities where such
land is prevalent, so this finding is
not too surprising.
 Neighborhoods of almost all types
and in almost all locations per-
formed better with respect to pop-
ulation change in the past decade
than they did in the 1980s (data not
shown in table 1), but there were
two major exceptions. One relates
to the troubled Largely White cities
in the Northeast. All types of
neighborhoods in these cities suf-
fered serious losses in both
decades, but for all groups except
predominantly white tracts, loss
rates were notably higher in the
1990s. The second exception relates
to neighborhoods of all types in the
Melting Pot metros of the West. As
with Hispanic tracts nationwide,
this is a case where extraordinarily
high growth rates in the 1980s sim-
ply settled down to more sustain-
able levels in the next decade.
Growth, Decline, 
and Racial Change
Researchers have long been inter-
ested in racial succession in urban
neighborhoods, and there has been
considerable anecdotal evidence of its
occurrence in the 1990s; for example,
concerning Hispanics moving into
formerly black ghettos and blacks
replacing whites in inner-ring sub-
urbs. There has been very little analy-
sis, however, of the degree to which
succession actually occurs.
Our data show that it does
indeed occur, but dramatic shifts in
proportions are not common, at least
not within the span of one decade.
For a large majority of tracts in the
100 cities, racial/ethnic composition
did not change markedly. Between
1980 and 1990, black shares of total
population changed by more than 
10 percentage points (up or down) in
only 16 percent of all tracts. The com-
parable proportions were 18 percent
for Hispanics and only 5 percent for
the “other race” category, but a
notably higher 37 percent for whites.
For whites, almost all the tracts
with share changes in excess of 
10 percentage points experienced
losses. The white share declined by 
10 to 20 points in 21 percent of the
tracts, by 20 to 40 points in 12 percent,
and by 40 or more points in 2 percent.
For the other groups, changes in
excess of 10 percent were almost
always increases in share, but here
too, few were dramatic. Only 2 per-
cent of all tracts saw Hispanic share
increases of 40 percentage points or
more; the percentage was the same for
blacks, and there were no tracts where
“other” races had share increases that
large. We decided to define a share
increase of 20 percentage points or
more as “significant” and to look at
the numbers for those changes more
closely: 4 percent of all tracts (558)
experienced share increases that large
for blacks, and 5 percent (731 tracts)
did so for Hispanics.
There were some notable differ-
ences in the types of neighborhoods
in which black and Hispanic shares
grew significantly. First, about half of
the tracts where the black share
increased significantly had grown
substantially (by 5 percent or more)
in the 1990s, whereas the other half
were either stable or declining. The
comparable tracts for Hispanics,
however, were almost all (91 percent)
in the substantial growth category.
Other differences show up in the
spatial pattern of these tracts by
region and city-type (table 3). For
blacks, the highest concentrations are
in the cities of the Largely White-
Black metros. They account for a
high 13 percent of all tracts in such
cities in the Midwest and 9 percent of
all tracts in cities of that type in both
the Northeast and South. We have
seen that tracts that were predomi-
nantly black in those cities in 1990
suffered significant population losses
in the 1990s. Many African Amer-
icans from those tracts no doubt
moved out to the suburbs, but these
data on share increases suggest that
blacks spread out within their central
cities as well. This theory is corrobo-
rated by the second column in table
3, showing that, in all areas, signifi-
cant increases in black share were
much less prevalent in high-poverty
tracts (those most likely to be losing
population) than they were in gen-
eral. Significant black share increases
were found in only 2 percent of high-
poverty tracts, compared with 4 per-
cent of all tracts.
For Hispanics, the pattern was
different. Tracts with significant
Hispanic share increases were found
in all regions and types of cities; they
were notably more common in
Melting Pot cities (7 percent of all
tracts in this category nationally) than
the other types (2 to 3 percent).
Another difference is that significant
increases in Hispanic share were
almost as prevalent in tracts with
high poverty rates (4 percent) as they
were in general (5 percent).
Population Growth 
in Poor Neighborhoods
We have learned so far that while
urban growth expanded over the past
decade, it did so selectively. Some
types of cities and some types of
neighborhoods within cities did
much better than others. High-
poverty neighborhoods, particularly
those with predominantly black pop-
ulations, generally saw the deepest
losses in population, as they did in
the 1980s. Generally, however, does
not mean always. We have looked at
differences in median rates across
groups, but, like all measures of cen-
tral tendency, medians mask variety.
How much variation was there in
population growth rates within these
categories? Quite a bit in most cases.
Among all central city tracts, 24 per-
cent lost population at a rate of 5 per-
cent or more in the 1990s. Not
surprisingly, among high-poverty
tracts (poverty rate of 30 percent or
more) a much higher share lost popu-
lation: 51 percent. But even among
low-poverty tracts (poverty less than
10 percent) a non-trivial 15 percent
lost at least 5 percent of their popula-
tions over the 1990s. This variation
also worked in the other direction. As
would be expected, a larger share of
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low-poverty tracts (50 percent) than
all tracts (44 percent) grew by 5 per-
cent or more in the 1990s. But even
high-poverty tracts had a sizeable
share, 29 percent, in the 5 percent or
more growth category.
This group, high-poverty neigh-
borhoods with significant growth,
represents a small part of the uni-
verse (976 tracts, 7 percent of all tracts
in the 100 cities), but they are impor-
tant. They demonstrate that it is pos-
sible to attract growth to at least some
high-poverty environments. Are they
all in the West, or are some of them in
the older big cities in the East, that is,
the kinds of neighborhoods urban
policy has long been hoping to turn
around?
The last two columns of table 3
show that high-poverty neighbor-
hoods that are growing significantly
exist in all regions and types of cities,
but their concentration varies. It is
indeed in the West where they repre-
sent the highest proportion of all
high-poverty tracts: 49 percent in
Melting Pot cities and 81 percent in
Largely White cities in that region.
But their concentrations are also high
in the other type of city with the
highest growth rates generally: the
Melting Pot cities of the other three
regions (49 percent in the Northeast
and about a third in both the
Midwest and the South). These grow-
ing high-poverty tracts make up
much smaller proportions of all high-
poverty tracts in the Largely White
and Largely White-Black cities of the
Northeast, Midwest, and South
(range of 9 to 22 percent).
The third column in table 3 shows
that significant increases in black pop-
ulation share were not common in
tracts of this type (only 2 percent of
these tracts, compared with 4 percent
of all tracts). The sixth column, how-
ever, shows that significant increases
in Hispanic share were much more
prevalent among these higher-growth
high-poverty neighborhoods, appear-
ing in 9 percent of all such tracts, com-
pared with only 5 percent of all tracts.
This comparative concentration of
Hispanic share increases held in
almost all regions and city types.
TABLE 3.  Population and Racial/Ethnic Change in High-Poverty Neighborhoods (Central Cities of 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas)
Source: Neighborhood Change Database, 1990, 2000.
Note: Excludes tracts with less than 200 population in both 1990 and 2000 and tracts with zero population in 1990. High-poverty tracts are those with 1990 poverty rates of 
30 percent or more.
High-poverty tracts
Tracts with black share increase of Tracts with Hispanic share increase of with population
20 percentage points or more, 1990s 20 percentage points or more, 1990s growth > 5%, 1990s
Percent Percent of Percent of Percent Percent of Percent of Percent of
of all high-poverty high-poverty of all high-poverty high-poverty No. of high-poverty
tracts tracts growth tracts tracts tracts growth tracts tracts tracts
Northeast
Melting Pot 3 1 2 3 1 1 247 49
Largely White 4 2 0 5 5 17 35 16
Largely White-Black 9 1 0 2 1 0 10 12
Total 4 1 2 3 2 3 292 36
Midwest
Melting Pot 3 2 6 8 3 8 105 32
Largely White 6 3 3 2 3 17 35 11
Largely White-Black 13 5 10 4 4 24 41 9
Total 7 4 6 5 3 13 181 17
South
Melting Pot 1 0 0 11 7 14 138 34
Largely White 2 0 0 3 8 23 30 22
Largely White-Black 9 3 4 1 0 1 79 17
Total 5 1 1 6 4 11 247 25
West
Melting Pot 0 0 0 8 10 13 202 49
Largely White 0 0 0 5 4 6 54 81
Total 0 0 0 8 9 12 256 53
Total U.S.
Melting Pot 2 1 2 7 5 8 692 42
Largely White 4 2 1 3 4 14 154 21
Largely White-Black 10 3 5 2 2 8 130 13
Total 4 2 2 5 4 9 976 29
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Implications
Full interpretation of how the well-
being of our urban neighborhoods
changed in the 1990s is not possible
until the economic and social indica-
tors from the 2000 census are avail-
able for analysis. The data presented
here, however, do offer an interesting
preview. Results are mixed, but the
situation is clearly a step up from the
almost universally bleak assessments
in studies of 1980s trends, particularly
for the northern regions. While some
cities in the Northeast and Midwest
still suffered declines, others, espe-
cially in Melting Pot metros, have
rebounded significantly.
In these cities, it is clear that over-
all growth did not imply turnarounds
for high-poverty neighborhoods in
general. Indeed, most such neighbor-
hoods continued to lose population,
particularly those that were predomi-
nantly African-American at the start
of the decade. Nonetheless, growth
was not confined solely to the wealth-
ier parts of town. A sizeable minority
of high-poverty neighborhoods did
grow significantly. The fact that they
were found in all regions and types of
cities indicates that change is indeed
possible, even in places where condi-
tions have seriously deteriorated.
Researchers should use the new
census data to examine many aspects
of neighborhood change in the 1990s,
but understanding what lies behind
these growing high-poverty neigh-
borhoods would seem to deserve pri-
ority. The general growth of Hispanic
and Asian populations was no doubt
an important factor in these areas, as
it was for large cities overall.
Gentrification surely also played a
role in some cases. We need to under-
stand to what extent (and where)
population growth was accompanied
by income growth and reinvestment,
and where it was not. The answers
should provide clues as to what it
may take to stimulate neighborhood
revitalization more broadly and to do
so in a manner that benefits, rather
than displaces, original residents.
Notes
1. This selection includes the largest 100 PMSAs
and MSAs based on their 1990 populations.
Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(PMSAs) are metropolitan subcomponents of
our largest urban agglomerations, Consol-
idated Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(CMSAs). Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs) are separate freestanding metropol-
itan areas. Since we ranked PMSAs and MSAs
by size, some smaller PMSAs within CMSAs
are not included. We also excluded suburban
PMSAs that did not have large central cities
within their boundaries. The Bureau of the
Census recognizes several individual munic-
ipalities as “central cities” in many metropol-
itan areas. In most cases, for this analysis we
accept only the predominant city as the cen-
tral city (e.g., Chicago in the Chicago PMSA).
There were seven exceptions, however, in
which we classified two municipalities as
together making up the central city:
Anaheim/Santa Ana, CA; Fort Lauderdale/
Hollywood, FL; Greensboro/Winston-
Salem, NC; Greenville/ Spartanburg, SC;
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN; Tampa/St.
Petersburg, FL; and West Palm Beach/Boca
Raton, FL.
2. These categories are adapted from typology
defined by demographer William Frey (2001).
3. One other research effort on neighborhood
population change in the 1990s so far is note-
worthy. Berube (forthcoming) analyzes vari-
ations in population change by tract location
within cities, whereas this paper focuses on
variations by tract racial/ethnic composition
and poverty level.
4. To avoid outliers, the database for this analy-
sis excludes all tracts with less than 200 pop-
ulation in both 1990 and 2000, and all tracts
with zero population in 1990, regardless of
their 2000 value. Data for 1980 also exclude
areas not a part of defined census tracts in
that year (these areas account for about 1 per-
cent of the 2000 population of the 100 largest
metropolitan area).
5. Census tract boundaries do not always con-
form to municipal boundaries. We define our
cities as the aggregation of census tracts (as
defined in 2000) that most closely approxi-
mates the official city (Census Place) bound-
aries in 2000 and, as noted, we use those same
boundaries for 1980 and 1990. Thus, our totals
for a city may differ from the Place totals pub-
lished by the Bureau of the Census. The
Neighborhood Change Database was devel-
oped by the Urban Institute and GeoLytics,
Inc. The Database is documented in Tatian
(2002), which can be found at
http://www.geolytics.com.
6. To allocate non-Hispanics who identified
more than one race in the 2000 census into the
three racial categories, we applied an algo-
rithm (developed by demographer Jeffrey
Passel—see explanation in Tatian 2002) that
we believe does a reasonably good job of
achieving comparability over time. First, we
assigned those who indicated black and any
other race(s) as black. Among those remain-
ing, we then assigned those who indicated
Asian and any other race(s) as Asian. Among
those remaining, similar assignments were
made for Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific
Islander, then for whites, and then for
American Indian/ Alaska Native. Finally,
after this procedure was complete, all groups
other than blacks and whites were added
together to form the “other race” category.
7. We applied Frey’s (2001) framework to our
selected metros using 2000 data, as he did in
his paper.
References
Berube, Alan. 2001. Racial Change in the Nation’s
Largest Cities: Evidence from the 2002 Census.
Washington, D.C.: Center on Urban and
Metropolitan Policy, Brookings Institution.
April.
__________. Forthcoming. Patchwork of
Population Change: Neighborhood Growth 
and Decline in Large Cities in the 1990s.
Washington, D.C.: Center on Urban and
Metropolitan Policy, Brookings Institution.
Frey, William H. 2001. Melting Pot Suburbs: A
Census 2000 Study of Suburban Diversity.
Washington, D.C.: Center on Urban and
Metropolitan Policy, Brookings Institution.
June.
Glaeser, Edward L., and Jesse M. Shapiro. 2001.
City Growth and the 2000 Census: Which
Places Grew and Why. Washington, D.C.:
Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy,
Brookings Institution. May.
Jargowsky, Paul A. 1997. Poverty and Place;
Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City. New
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Kasarda, John D., Stephen J. Appold, Stuart
Sweeney, and Elaine Sieff. 1997. “Central-
City and Suburban Migration Patterns: Is a
Turnaround on the Horizon?” Housing
Policy Debate 8(2): 307–58.
Katz, Bruce, and Alan Berube. 2002. “Cities
Rebound—Somewhat.” The American
Enterprise 13(4): 47.
Mincy, Ronald B., and Susan J. Wiener. 1993.
The Underclass in the 1980s: Changing
Concepts, Constant Reality. Washington,
D.C.: The Urban Institute.
Simmons, Patrick A., and Robert E. Lang. 2001.
The Urban Turnaround: A Decade-by-Decade
Report Card on Postwar Population Change in
Older Industrial Cities. Washington, D.C.:
Fannie Mae Foundation.
Tatian, Peter A. 2002. CensusCD Neighborhood
Change Database (NCDB) Data Users’ Guide:
Short Form Release. Washington, D.C.: The
Urban Institute.
G. Thomas Kingsley
coordinates the
Neighborhood 
Change in Urban
America series and is
director of the
National Neighbor-
hood Indicators Partnership.
Kathryn L. S. Pettit is
deputy director of the
National Neighbor-
hood Indicators
Partnership and
codirector of a project
examining the rela-
tionships between neighborhood
conditions and health outcomes.
The Neighborhood Change in Urban America Series
10
TABLE A-1.  Characteristics of Central Cities (100 Largest Metropolitan Areas)
Population Percent of tracts by rate of Median 1990–2000 tract
change population change, population change by 1990 
Population (%) 1990–2000 predominant race/ethnicity
2000
(thousand) 1980–90 1990–00 < –5% –5 to +5% > +5% White Black Hispanic None
Northeast, Melting Pot 8,671 2.7 8.8 13 22 65 11 5 10 13
New York, NY 8,008 3.6 9.4 22 67 0 11 7 10 14
Bergen, NJ 149 2.1 5.9 16 58 0 27 –10 7 9
Jersey City, NJ 240 2.2 5.0 32 45 0 12 –12 134 5
Newark, NJ 274 –16.3 –0.5 21 37 0 15 –12 5 4
Northeast, Largely White 2,794 –2.3 –3.9 47 34 19 –3 –12 –16 –4
Providence, RI 174 2.5 8.0 13 18 68 11 0 0 7
Boston, MA 589 2.2 2.6 23 39 38 2 –1 –34 6
Worcester, MA 173 4.9 1.7 15 63 22 1 0 –2 –4
Allentown, PA–NJ 107 1.5 1.1 19 59 22 2 0 0 –9
Bridgeport, CT 140 –0.6 –1.5 33 23 44 11 –16 –26 0
Springfield, MA 152 3.1 –3.1 43 43 14 –1 –13 –11 –9
Rochester, NY 220 –4.2 –4.9 46 51 4 –3 –8 0 –8
New Haven, CT 124 3.5 –5.2 41 38 21 –3 –16 0 –3
Albany, NY 96 0.3 –5.3 46 50 4 –4 –11 0 –9
Harrisburg, PA 49 –1.7 –6.5 60 33 7 –1 –11 0 –5
Scranton, PA 76 –7.2 –6.6 74 22 4 –6 0 0 0
Pittsburgh, PA 335 –12.7 –9.5 72 25 4 –8 –16 0 –8
Syracuse, NY 147 –3.5 –10.1 68 23 9 –7 –20 0 –11
Buffalo, NY 293 –8.2 –10.8 69 24 7 –7 –16 0 –13
Hartford, CT 122 2.5 –13.0 67 12 21 15 –18 –21 –16
Northeast, Largely White-Black 1,518 –6.0 –4.3 42 39 19 0 –10 –15 –2
Philadelphia, PA–NJ 1,518 –6.0 –4.3 42 39 19 0 –10 –15 –2
Midwest, Melting Pot 3,565 –6.1 –4.1 30 27 42 6 –7 4 8
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN–WI 670 –0.1 4.6 14 42 44 1 9 0 9
Chicago, IL 2,895 –7.4 4.0 34 24 42 9 –7 4 8
Midwest, Largely White 4,288 0.1 1.5 47 31 22 –2 –14 –5 –6
Wichita, KS 345 6.1 9.7 31 36 34 –1 –19 0 4
Columbus, OH 742 11.1 9.2 40 29 31 0 –13 0 –5
Indianapolis, IN 799 4.2 7.0 39 28 33 0 –14 0 –5
Grand Rapids, MI 198 3.8 5.3 13 52 35 0 0 0 5
Omaha, NE–IA 395 3.1 4.8 28 40 31 0 –6 0 –1
Kansas City, MO–KS 444 –2.9 1.3 49 27 24 0 –13 –5 –12
Akron, OH 216 –6.8 –3.4 40 52 8 –4 –7 0 –5
Toledo, OH 310 –6.1 –5.8 60 33 7 –5 –16 0 –8
Lansing, MI 122 –2.3 –5.9 67 29 5 –7 –13 0 –9
Cincinnati, OH–KY–IN 338 –5.6 –8.6 65 30 5 –7 –13 0 –6
Dayton, OH 172 –7.1 –9.6 78 16 6 –7 –16 0 –14
Flint, MI 125 –11.9 –11.4 76 20 5 –10 –16 0 –1
Youngstown, OH 82 –17.2 –14.3 85 13 3 –8 –25 0 –22
Midwest, Largely White-Black 2,478 –11.4 –7.4 60 26 14 –1 –12 –12 –3
Milwaukee, WI 597 –1.3 –5.0 52 30 18 –2 –18 –12 –2
Cleveland, OH 478 –11.9 –5.4 53 36 12 –1 –10 0 –11
Detroit, MI 951 –14.6 –7.5 64 19 17 7 –9 0 1
Gary, IN 103 –23.2 –11.9 91 9 0 –15 –14 0 0
St. Louis, MO–IL 348 –12.4 –12.2 68 25 7 –4 –23 0 –13
South, Melting Pot 7,468 9.3 13.6 22 26 52 11 –8 2 15
Austin, TX 664 31.3 31.5 3 20 77 16 13 1 23
Fort Worth, TX 532 14.1 19.0 15 22 62 15 –8 16 17
Dallas, TX 1,190 10.5 17.9 17 22 61 13 –8 18 25
Orlando, FL 204 12.5 16.8 35 21 44 10 –9 0 –6
Houston, TX 1,935 3.6 15.3 16 22 62 7 –1 7 19
San Antonio, TX 1,155 18.0 15.0 14 29 56 27 –9 2 9
El Paso, TX 563 19.7 8.8 43 33 24 11 0 –6 –1
Ft. Lauderdale/Hollywood, FL 290 –2.7 6.0 16 35 49 4 –4 0 8
Miami, FL 363 3.1 0.9 30 40 30 5 –12 2 1
Washington, DC–MD–VA 572 –4.9 –5.7 55 30 15 1 –10 0 –1
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TABLE A-1.  Characteristics of Central Cities (100 Largest Metropolitan Areas) (Continued)
Population Percent of tracts by rate of Median 1990–2000 tract
change population change, population change by 1990 
Population (%) 1990–2000 predominant race/ethnicity
2000
(thous) 1980–90 1990–00 < –5% –5 to +5% > +5% White Black Hispanic None
South, Largely White 2,256 0.3 6.6 23 39 38 4 –8 9 2
W. Palm Beach/Boca Raton, FL 151 13.9 18.6 13 15 72 15 –8 0 4
Oklahoma City, OK 510 9.6 13.2 19 32 49 8 –15 0 2
Tulsa, OK 392 –0.4 7.1 15 44 41 3 –2 0 16
Tampa/St. Petersburg, FL 547 0.8 5.9 21 42 37 4 –10 9 0
Johnson City, TN–VA 52 –1.7 4.9 17 50 33 1 0 0 0
Knoxville, TN 183 –4.8 2.5 37 33 31 2 –11 0 –9
Chattanooga, TN–GA 162 –8.7 2.0 35 42 23 3 –9 0 –3
Louisville, KY–IN 258 –8.8 –3.7 35 54 12 –3 –7 0 8
South, Largely White-Black 6,552 3.0 4.7 36 30 34 4 –8 0 0
Charlotte, NC–SC 551 22.5 27.5 17 23 60 14 –2 0 10
Raleigh, NC 278 29.3 22.8 12 27 62 10 0 0 8
Jacksonville, FL 737 17.9 15.9 24 31 45 6 –9 0 –2
Greensboro/Winst. Salem, NC 404 6.0 13.8 13 34 53 10 1 0 17
Nashville, TN 541 6.8 11.6 17 37 46 6 –1 0 0
Norfolk, VA 425 51.7 8.2 24 37 39 3 0 0 1
Atlanta, GA 415 –7.2 6.4 27 25 48 17 0 0 2
Little Rock, AR 189 –1.2 3.4 39 32 30 2 –20 0 –1
Baton Rouge, LA 227 –7.8 3.3 30 21 48 6 –7 0 12
Wilmington, DE–NJ–MD 73 1.9 1.6 33 30 37 5 –1 0 –3
Mobile, AL 194 –2.1 0.9 28 45 28 0 –4 0 –5
Columbia, SC 114 –8.0 –1.2 51 24 24 1 –9 0 –8
Charleston, SC 102 3.6 –2.0 64 18 18 0 –14 0 1
Memphis, TN–AR–MS 637 –0.9 –2.3 47 28 25 4 –16 0 –2
New Orleans, LA 485 –10.8 –2.5 39 39 22 2 –6 0 1
Richmond, VA 198 –7.4 –2.5 45 35 20 0 –6 0 0
Greenville/Spartanburg, SC 98 –4.2 –7.4 67 28 6 –3 –17 0 –13
Birmingham, AL 231 –11.2 –10.0 62 25 13 –1 –14 0 –1
Baltimore, MD 651 –6.3 –11.5 65 22 13 –4 –17 0 –4
West, Melting Pot 12,670 21.2 14.0 11 32 56 7 6 4 9
Las Vegas, NV 485 52.0 81.9 4 11 85 66 14 0 31
Phoenix, AZ 1,327 23.0 34.0 4 12 84 24 9 14 32
Bakersfield, CA 246 43.6 28.6 7 34 59 7 0 2 4
Fresno, CA 457 34.7 19.2 11 19 70 9 54 13 8
Ventura, CA 166 26.9 19.1 3 7 90 7 0 20 15
Anaheim/Santa Ana, CA 647 31.1 17.9 4 15 82 17 0 13 21
Tucson, AZ 491 15.8 16.4 7 38 55 6 0 4 15
Albuquerque, NM 452 15.1 16.3 26 35 39 –1 0 3 3
Stockton, CA 245 38.9 14.3 15 47 38 1 0 7 2
San Jose, CA 919 20.0 14.1 5 32 64 3 0 15 13
Riverside, CA 254 34.0 12.6 7 41 52 5 0 5 6
San Diego, CA 1,222 29.7 10.1 14 40 46 2 4 2 6
Sacramento, CA 396 34.0 9.9 12 42 46 2 0 0 7
Oakland, CA 399 9.9 7.3 8 38 55 1 12 19 6
San Francisco, CA 777 6.8 7.3 8 39 53 3 17 8 6
Vallejo, CA 119 36.1 6.7 7 34 59 2 0 0 10
Los Angeles, CA 3,697 17.5 6.0 14 38 48 4 3 1 10
Honolulu, HI 372 3.6 –1.3 37 38 25 –9 0 0 2
West, Largely White 2,029 1.4 11.8 3 40 57 6 16 20 15
Denver, CO 555 –4.7 18.7 1 31 67 6 25 20 28
Salt Lake City, UT 181 –2.0 13.6 0 45 55 8 0 0 13
Seattle, WA 563 5.3 9.1 1 46 53 5 6 0 11
Portland, OR 538 1.8 8.8 6 38 56 6 16 0 1
Tacoma, WA 192 11.2 8.4 9 45 45 3 0 0 12
Source: Neighborhood Change Database, 1980, 1990, 2000.
Note: Excludes tracts with less than 200 population in both 1990 and 2000 and tracts with zero population in 1990; predominant race = race or ethnic group accounting for 60%
or more of tract population; predominant race as of 1990.
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